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INTRODUCTION
In 1980, plaintiff Sedonia Sparks began working in the distribution
department at Tulane Medical Center Hospital and Clinic (Clinic). Her
responsibilities included distributing medical supplies to the various clinic
units. By 1984, plaintiff had been promoted to manager of the de-
partment. Her job required interaction with employees of the general
stores department who managed the hospital supply storeroom. At trial,
plaintiff testified that during her early years at the Clinic, marijuana
smoking was taking place in the storeroom.2 She also claimed to have
seen a storeroom employee, Calvin Green, give someone a small white
package in exchange for cash.3 Plaintiff testified that from early 1982
through 1986 a wide variety of disturbing events took place in which
she appeared to have been the intended victim of abuse. Among these
were: 1) someone urinated in her coffee pot and left it under her desk
over the weekend; 2) someone urinated in an office wastepaper basket;
3) someone stole plaintiff's shoes, radio, and lamp; 4) someone stole
plaintiff's employees' time cards; and 5) someone poured water into
supply bins ruining sterile medical supplies.
4
The distribution department was responsible for stocking the store-
room shelves from Monday through Friday. The storeroom department,
however, provided two employees to stock the storeroom on weekends.
Storeroom employees Calvin Green and Terry Givens admitted to not
stocking the shelves over the weekend of April 4 through 5, 1987, as
part of a protest against what they considered unequal responsibilities
between the storeroom and distribution departments. A meeting to dis-
cuss the problem was held between plaintiff; Eddie Spillar, the storeroom
Copyright 1990, by LoUISIANA LAw REVIEW.
1. 546 So. 2d 138 (La. 1989) (Marcus, J., Cole, J., and Hall, J. pro tempore,
dissenting).
2. Several other employees testified that they had also observed marijuana being
smoked in the storeroom or noticed the smell of marijuana in the storeroom.
3. Apparently believing the exchange was an illicit drug transfer, she confronted
Green concerning the exchange either in late 1981 or early 1982. This appeared to be the
start of her problems.
4. The incidents of urination, as well as the time card thefts, were reported to
Clinic security and confirmed by other employees at trial.
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manager; and Harold Davis, Jr., the assistant director of materials
management. During the meeting, plaintiff and Spillar argued over the
state of affairs at the Clinic, and Spillar admitted in court that he told
Sparks, "That's why there are a lot of people around here [who] want
to kick your behind." 5 Plaintiff, however, testified that Spillar said if
Green and Givens were suspended, "Those guys were really going to
get me." ' 6 Davis suspended Green and Givens following the meeting.
Upset by the "threats," plaintiff left work later that day, April 6, 1987,
and did not return.
THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE
The day after Ms. Sparks left work, she sought treatment for
headaches and depression from her physician, Dr. Dwight Green. After
prescribing medication, Dr. Green instructed plaintiff to rest at home
and return for a follow-up visit in two weeks. On April 21, 1987, Dr.
Green recommended that plaintiff see a psychiatrist and referred her to
Dr. Joseph Roniger. 7 Dr. Green later saw plaintiff for seven follow-up
visits culminating with a visit in October, 1987. At trial, Dr. Green
testified that Ms. Sparks was disabled due to the headaches and de-
pression and that he felt she was unable to return to work as late as
October, 1987. Dr. Green also opined that plaintiff's headaches were
related to her work problems and that she was "not able to function"'
or work during the period in which he treated her.
Dr. Roniger examined plaintiff twice during May, 1987. Dr. Roniger
diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from an "adjustment disorder" arising
from a particularly stressful situation.9 Dr. Roniger felt this condition
5. The testimony is quoted in the appellate court opinion. Sparks v. Tulane Med.
Center Hosp. and Clinic, 537 So. 2d 276, 278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
6. Id.
7. It is interesting to note that a Dr. Richard Roniger was a witness in another
mental/mental case issued the same day by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Although the
court reached the same result in that case, Dr. Richard Roniger testified that he did not
think the plaintiff suffered from "posttraumatic stress disorder" and thereby had been
a witness for the defendant employer. See Williams v. Regional Transit Auth., 546 So.
2d 150 (La. 1989). This writer does not know if the Dr. Joseph Roniger who testified
for Ms. Sparks is the same Dr. Richard Roniger who testified for defendant in Williams.
8. This description of her condition is found in the supreme court opinion, but not
the appellate court opinion. Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 141.
9. The fields of psychiatry and psychology have many labels for varying degrees of
mental disabilities. Among these are "posttraumatic stress disorder" and "adjustment
disorder." The label should be immaterial to the determination of compensability under
the Worker's Compensation Act. What should matter is whether the employee has suffered
an injury caused by accident during the course of and arising out of his/her employment
resulting in the inability to return to the work force. The particular label given to the
injury is of no significance. Note the irrelevant discussion of these "labels" in Williams,
546 So. 2d at 155-56.
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was "definitely job related" and warranted counseling. Although Dr.
Roniger was unsure of the duration of plaintiff's disability, he was of
the opinion that she was disabled and that the disability was due to
"whatever was happening to her at her place of work." 10
Upon Dr. Roniger's recommendation, plaintiff, in an effort to im-
prove her condition, sought help from Ms. Emily Jahncke, a clinical
social worker. Ms. Jahncke testified that in the initial stages of treatment
plaintiff was so upset that she could hardly walk. Ms. Jahncke agreed
that plaintiff's condition was work related, but opined that plaintiff was
probably capable of returning to work by September 30, 1987.
Although the Clinic did not present any medical witnesses, it did
call the causation issue into question by establishing that plaintiff was
previously diagnosed with depression in 1970 and with sinus headaches
in 1985. The Clinic also proved that plaintiff complained to a physician
of headaches following an apparent blow to the head in February, 1986.
No evidence was introduced to show any further treatment was needed
or sought for this condition. Dr. Green testified that he did not consider
the headaches from this prior event related to the tension headaches
for which he treated plaintiff subsequent to her leaving work in April,
1987."1
THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Ms. Sparks sought recovery under the Worker's Compensation Act 2
for her inability to work due to job-related stress. The district court
denied relief after determining that no "accident"' 3 had occurred which
caused or resulted in plaintiff's disability.
The fourth circuit reversed, reasoning that plaintiff had become
disabled due to job related stress and had "suffered personal injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of her employment under
10, Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 141.
11, In a brief paragraph, the Louisiana Supreme Court abridged the above facts as
follows:
In summary, then, we have a plaintiff who was diagnosed with a psychological
adjustment disorder, depression and tension headaches, and who also complained
of anxiety, loss of appetite, insomnia and nightmares. Three experts, an internist,
a psychiatrist and a clinical social worker, related these problems to plaintiff's
employment. Defendant presented no medical testimony but attempted to es-
tablish that plaintiff had pre-existing medical problems.
Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 142. Note that all three experts, Dr. Green, Dr. Roniger, and Ms.
Jahncke, testified they believed the disability to be work related. However, there is no
testimony in the record by these experts that the disability was caused by an "unexpected
or unforeseen event happening violently or suddenly" as contrasted to a gradual buildup
of stress.
12. La. R.S. 23:1021-1379 (1985 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter Act].
13. See infra note 22.
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Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1031." ' 14 Although the court refused to
grant plaintiff penalties and attorney's fees, 5 the court awarded plaintiff
$7,303.24, finding plaintiff suffered temporary total disability from April
6, 1987 to September 30, 1987.16
14. Sparks v. Tulane Med. Center Hosp. and Clinic, 537 So. 2d 276, 280-81 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1988).
15. La. R.S. 23:1201.2 (Supp. 1990) states in pertinent part that "[any insurer liable
for claims arising under this Chapter . . . shall pay the amount of any claim due under
this Chapter within sixty days after receipt of written notice. Failure to make such payment
within sixty days after receipt of notice, when such failure is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, or without probable cause, shall subject employer or insurer, in addition to
the amount of the claim due, to payment of all reasonable attorney's fees for the
prosecution and collection of such claim, .... The court found that the Clinic's ob-
jections to the plaintiff's claims were not "arbitrary, capricious, or without probable
cause" due to plaintiff's earlier reports of headaches and depression and the "peculiar
nature and lack of clear outward manifestations of her psychological disabilities." Sparks,
537 So. 2d at 281.
16. This award was based upon La. R.S. 23:1221(1), which at the time of Sparks
stated:
Temporary total. For injury producing temporary total disability of an employee
to engage in any self-employment or gainful occupation for wages whether or
not the same or a similar occupation as that in which the employee was
customarily engaged when injured and whether or not an occupation for which
the employee at the time of injury was particularly fitted by reason of education,
training, or experience, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages during the
period of such disability.
La. R.S. 23:1221(1) was amended by 1988 La. Acts No. 938, § 1 (effective January 1,
1989) and 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 6 (effective January 1, 1990) to effectively hinge an
award of benefits based on temporary total disability upon the "physical condition" of
the recipient.
The latest amendment states in pertinent part:
(c) For purposes of Subparagraph (1)(a) of this Paragraph, whenever the em-
ployee is not engaged in any employment or self-employment as described in
Subparagraph (1)(b) of this Paragraph, compensation for temporary total dis-
ability shall be awarded only if the employee proves by clear and convincing
evidence, unaided by any presumption of disability, that the employee is phys-
ically unable to engage in any employment or self-employment, regardless of
the nature or character of the employment or self-employment, including but
not limited to any and all odd-lot employment, sheltered employment, or em-
ployment while working in any pain, notwithstanding the location or availability
of any such employment or self-employment.
(d) An award of benefits based on temporary total disability shall cease when
the physical condition of the employee has resolved itself to the point that a
reasonably reliable determination of the extent of disability of the employee
may be made, and the employee's physical condition has improved to the point
that continued, regular treatment by a physician is not required, or six months
after the injury, whichever first occurs. If the claimant contends that his disability
is of a temporary nature, but extends beyond this six-month period, he must
submit a claim for extension of the period of temporary total disability under
[Vol. 50
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The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this type of
mental/mental' 7 injury can indeed be compensable under the Act. 8
R.S. 23:1310.3.
1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 6 (emphasis added).
The possible effects of the amended version of La. R.S. 23:1221(1) (Supp. 1990) on
mental/mental claims is discussed infra text accompanying notes 117-22.
17. Mental/mental claims are claims based on a mental injury caused purely by mental
stress unaccompanied by any physical trauma or impact. See A. Larson, lB Workmen's
Compensation Law, § 42.20 (1986 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter Larson].
18. Recovery in tort for mental/mental claims having nothing to do with employment
has always been a potent source of controversy. Most courts limit recovery in tort to
those cases in which the mental injury is to be reasonably expected under the circumstances.
The reasonableness of the injury is an objective inquiry. Many states, however, retain a
physical manifestation requirement, usually with two exceptions, the death telegram rule
and the negligent interference with dead bodies. The exceptions are probably due to the
likelihood of actual distress upon their occurrence, thereby lessening the chance of recovery
without established causation. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts
§ 54, at 361-62 (5th ed. 1984) and St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.
1987).
In Louisiana, at least two cases in tort hold special interest. In Re Air Crash Disaster
Near New Orleans, 764 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1985), outlines the prerequisites to recovery
for mental anguish due to damage to property. Special note should be taken of the
discussion in the opinion regarding the potential for fabrication involved in these claims.
The court stresses proof of causation must be "clearly established" as a safeguard against
fabrication in the highly subjective mental anguish claim. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp.,
556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990), outlines the prerequisites to recovery for mental anguish due
to injury to a spouse. In Lejeune, the plaintiff's husband was a patient at the defendant
hospital. Mrs. Lejeune suffered mental anguish after observing facial wounds inflicted
upon her husband by hungry rodents during his stay at the hospital. The issue for the
court was the compensability for mental pain and anguish sustained by a person who
was not directly injured but who suffered because of witnessing the negligent infliction
of injury on a third person. Overruling Black v. Carrollton R.R. Co., 10 La. Ann 33
(1855), and over one hundred years of jurisprudence, the court held in favor of com-
pensability. After reviewing safeguards used in other jurisdictions to ensure established
causation in mental/mental cases, the court set four restrictions that must be met before
recovery is granted: 1) A claimant need not be physically injured, nor suffer physical
impact. The claimant must, however, either view the accident or injury-causing event or
come upon the accident scene soon thereafter and before substantial change has occurred
in the victim's condition; 2) The direct victim of the traumatic injury must suffer such
harm that it can reasonably be expected that one in the plaintiff's position would suffer
serious mental anguish from the experience; 3) The emotional distress must be both serious
and reasonably foreseeable. The distress must go well beyond simple mental pain and
anguish. The mental pain and anguish over injury to a third person should be both severe
and debilitating; and 4) There must be a "relationship" between the claimant and the
direct victim. The court refused to delineate the scope of the "relationship" finding that
Mrs. Lejeune was a qualified claimant.
These two cases illustrate the concern of the courts for ensuring that causation is clearly
established in mental/mental cases. However, one should consider that the comparison
between tort law and worker's compensation law is not particularly useful due to the
differing objectives of the two systems of recovery. This comparison is given to make
the reader aware of the breadth of controversy within the mental/mental issue.
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The primary goal of this article is to consider the compensability
of mental/mental claims in light of the 1989 amendments to the Act
on fact patterns similar to Sparks. Although mental/mental claims are
now statutorily compensable, 9 just what fact patterns support recovery
is subject to much debate. First discussed are the pertinent statutes in
force at the time of Sparks. A brief excursus into the status of mental/
mental claims prior to Sparks will then be undertaken. An analysis of
the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion in Sparks follows. The paper
will culminate with an examination of the possible effects that the 1989
amendments20 to the Act may have upon a factual situation similar to
Sparks.
PERTINENT STATUTES IN FORCE AT TIME OF SPARKS DECISION
The fundamental requirement for recovery under the Act is provided
in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1031, which, unchanged in pertinent
part since Sparks, provides coverage to any employee not otherwise
eliminated from the benefits of worker's compensation who receives,
"personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment."
The statutory definition, as well as the jurisprudential interpretation
of the words "injury" and "accident," are of paramount importance
in deciding the compensability of a mental/mental claim. At the time
of Sparks, "injury," for purposes of worker's compensation, was defined
to "include only injuries by violence to the physical structure of the
body and such disease or infection as naturally result therefrom. These
terms shall in no case be construed to include any other form of disease
or derangement, however caused or contracted." 21 An "accident" was
defined as, "an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or
19. La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(a) (Supp. 1990).
20. See 1989 La. Acts No. 454, §§ I & 6 (effective January 1, 1990). Establishing
that the mental injury was caused by the employment will always be difficult in a mental/
mental case. This difficulty is more pronounced due to the competing lines of causation
which are usually present in these cases. Mental injuries not caused by employment should
be excluded from the Act, while those mental injuries actually occurring due to employment
should be included within the ambit of the Act. The means and methods of establishing
causation, as well as the substance of the necessary proof, has been redefined by the
Louisiana Legislature in 1989. See Johnson, Workers' Compensation, 50 La. L. Rev. 391
(1989). See also Larson, supra note 17, § 42.23 at 7-656. Whether this legislative restruc-
turing of the methods of causation and substance of a mental/mental claim will alter the
analysis in fact patterns similar to Sparks is debatable. See infra text accompanying notes
91-128. It appears that the 1989 amendments to the Act, however, contain statutory
language designed to increase the difficulty of proving causation in mental/mental cases.
21. La. R.S. 23:1021(7). Section 1021(7) was subsequently amended by 1989 La. Acts
No. 454, § 1. For a discussion of this amendment, see infra text accompanying notes
103-16.
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violently with or without human fault, and producing at the time ob-
jective symptoms of an injury. ' 2  Analysis of this basic statutory re-
quirement and these two definitions provide the legal framework for
the Sparks decision.23
STATUS OF MENTAL/MENTAL CLAIMS IN LOUISIANA PRIOR TO SPARKS
Until the time of Sparks, the Louisiana courts of appeal were split
as to the compensability of a mental injury induced by job-related mental
stress not accompanied by any apparent signs of physical trauma.
First Circuit
The first circuit dealt with the problem in Sutherland v. Time Saver
Stores, Inc.24 In Sutherland, a female convenience store clerk sued her
employer for total and permanent disability, medical payments, and
statutory penalties under the Act after being robbed while working alone
at the store. During the incident the bandit ordered the plaintiff to
disrobe. Before plaintiff completed the demand, the police arrived caus-
ing the robber to flee. The court denied recovery under the Act refusing
to recognize that either an "injury" or an "accident" had taken place. 21
The court stated,
Though Louisiana is in the minority, it is the law of this state,
from which we are not ready to depart, that in order to recover
in worker's compensation for a mental disability there must first
exist a physical detriment as a causative or contributory factor.
In other words, there must exist some objective symptoms of
injury, either at the time of the incident or subsequent thereto,
which naturally result from violence to the physical structure of
the body .... When the legislature employed "the objective
symptoms of injury terminology" in the definitional provisions
of the worker's compensation statutes, it envisioned a situation
where only observable physical symptoms of injury could result
in coverage. Symptoms exclusively within the subjective mindset
22. La. R.S. 23:1021(1). Section 1021(1) was subsequently amended by 1989 La. Acts
No. 454, § 1. For a discussion of this amendment, see infra text accompanying notes
91-103.
23. Every worker's compensation case involving the compensability of employee "mis-
fortune" will involve at least these statutory definitions. However, any claims involving
mental injuries, however caused, will involve interpretation of yet another statutory def-
inition beginning January 1, 1990. For further discussion of this topic, see infra text
accompanying notes 103-24.
24. 428 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
25. La. R.S. 23:1021(1) & (6), as amended by 1975 La. Acts No. 583, § 1.
19901
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of the plaintiff will not satisfy the requirements of the statute.2 6
Second Circuit
The second circuit twice addressed the mental/mental issue. The
most recent decision was Jordan v. Southern National Gas Co.,27 in
which the court denied recovery under the Act. Jordan allegedly suffered
mental disability due to anxiety surrounding a job transfer that he felt
was a "demotion." Finding that no "accident" or "injury" had oc-
curred,2 the court refused to provide coverage to an employee disabled
by "mental problems aggravated by self imposed stress on the job."'29
In Franklin v. Complete Auto Transit Co.,30 the plaintiff claimed
benefits due to mental disability incurred after narrowly avoiding a
collision between his 18-wheeler and an automobile that drove into his
path. Approximately one year earlier, plaintiff had been involved in an
accident under extraordinarily similar circumstances in which the driver
of the other automobile was killed and the child passenger severely
injured. Although two psychiatrists testified that plaintiff was mentally
disabled due to the mental strain of these work related events, the court.
denied coverage reasoning that plaintiff had not suffered an "injury"
or "personal injury" under the Act.3"
Third Circuit
The third circuit may be the most experienced circuit in handling
mental/mental cases. As far back as 1967, the third circuit struggled
with two mental/mental cases within a span of one month. In Hackett
v. Travelers Insurance,a2 the court was presented with a made to order
mental/mental case. Plaintiff was mentally disabled to the point of
voluntarily committing himself to the Central Louisiana State Hospital
at Pineville after witnessing the death of two fellow employees when a
charge of dynamite exploded within a few feet of their bodies. While
26. 428 So. 2d at 975 citing Franklin v. Complete Auto Transit Co., 397 So. 2d 60
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). For further discussion of Franklin, see infra
text accompanying notes 30-31. It is interesting to note that by granting compensation in
Sparks, the supreme court is totally consistent with this particular theory from Sutherland.
The only difference in reasoning is that the supreme court appears to more liberally
construe just what "violence to the physical structure of the body" entails. In Sparks,
Justice Calogero explicitly states that an "accident" actually occurred under the facts of
Sutherland. See Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 147.
27. 455 So. 2d 1217 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
28. See La. R.S. 23:1021(1) & (6), as amended by 1975 La. Acts No. 583, § 1.
29. Jordan, 455 So. 2d at 1226.
30. 397 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
31. La. R.S. 23:1021(6), as amended by 1975 La. Acts 583, § 1.
32. 195 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 197 So. 2d 652 (1967).
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conceding that plaintiff was "permanently and totally disabled," the
court denied recovery since plaintiff suffered no "physical injury or
trauma." 33
Shortly thereafter, Judge Tate, shackled by Danziger,a4 again denied
recovery to a traveling circulation representative of a daily newspaper
who had suffered a mental breakdown caused by the demands and
pressures of his job.3" Although the facts surrounding the injury were
not nearly as meritorious towards recovery as Hackett, the court dis-
missed the claim without so much as a discussion of the merits.
In Stuckey v. Home Insurance,3 6 plaintiff allegedly became mentally
disabled due to a series of conflicts with his boss. The court stated3 7
that Stuckey's mental/mental claim would have been compensable if he
could have proven that the causative on the job stress was "extraordinary
or greater than [that encountered in] everyday life.''3 The importance
of the Stuckey case was not that the court denied recovery, but that
the court recognized the possibility of mental/mental claims being com-
pensable under the Act. 9
The third circuit again confronted the mental/mental problem in
Davis v. Oilfield Scrap and Equipment Co.40 In Davis, plaintiff was
33. Id. at 759. Citing Danziger v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 245 La. 33, 156
So. 2d 468 (1963), the court reasoned that psychic trauma producing disability is not
compensable under the Act. See Hackett, 195 So. 2d at 759. The Danziger opinion
concluded that paragraph (7) of La. R.S. 23:1021 defined "injury" in such a way as to
eliminate disabilities stemming from emotional causes. This is a rather specious rationale,
for had Mr. Hackett been struck by a dismembered body part as a result of the blast,
recovery would have been certain. Danziger was later overruled by Ferguson v. HDE,
Inc., 264 La. 204, 270 So. 2d 867 (1972). Ferguson broke new ground in Louisiana
jurisprudence by allowing recovery for a physical injury (stroke) induced by mental stress.
34. 245 La. 33, 156 So. 2d 468 (1963). See supra note 33.
35. See Johnson v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 196 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1967).
36. 433 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 435 So. 2d 450 (1983).
37. Citing McDonald v. International Paper Co., 406 So. 2d 582 (La. 1981). Curiously,
McDonald was a case in which mental stress caused a physical injury. It was not a
mental/mental case.
38. Stuckey, 433 So. 2d at 778.
39. Plaintiff also attempted to secure coverage under the Act by alleging his mental/
mental disability is compensable as an "occupational disease." La. R.S. 23:1031.1, as
amended by 1975 La. Acts No. 644, §§ 1 & 2, defined a compensable occupational
disease. Plaintiff was unsuccessful. Whether mental/mental claims should be compensable
under present La. R.S. 23:1031.1 (Supp. 1990) is beyond the scope of this paper. For a
discussion of the potential applicability of the "occupational disease" approach to mental/
mental claims, see Comment, Worker's Compensation: Compensating Claimants Who
Suffer Psychological Disabilities Caused Solely By Job Related Mental Stress, 60 Tul. L.
Rev. 651 (1986).
40. 482 So. 2d 970 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986). H. Alston Johnson, III, Adjunct Professor
of Law at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center (L.S.U.), and the leading commentator on
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employed as a personal secretary to a corporate executive. While at
work, plaintiff heard a gunshot and rushed to her boss' office to find
he had shot himself in the chest with a large caliber handgun. She tried
to assist the victim for approximately twenty minutes while awaiting
medical personnel. By the time the authorities arrived, however, he had
died. Plaintiff was alternatingly sedate and hysterical. 4' Although plaintiff
continued to work for a few months subsequent to the event, she was
eventually hospitalized and later filed suit 42 against the employer. Using
a different approach the court, citing Guillot v. Sentry Insurance,43
granted recovery under the Act, not for a mental/mental claim, but for
a mental/physical claim. The court concluded that plaintiff indeed suf-
fered an injury by "violence to the physical structure of the body" that
was evidenced by clinical documentation of changes in plaintiff's EEG's
and chemical analyses." Thus, without the fetter of Danziger,41 and with
a fact pattern reminiscent of Hackett,46 the third circuit awarded a
seemingly deserving employee her recovery under the Act. 47
the Act, noted that Davis is "[olne of the most interesting, and potentially most important,
recent decisions by Louisiana courts .... See 1 W. Malone & A. Johnson, Worker's
Compensation Law and Practice, § 235, in 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d. ed. 1980
& Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Treatise].
41. Prior to this "accident," plaintiff had been diagnosed as having a "multiple
personality disorder." See Davis, 482 So. 2d at 974.
42. Plaintiff filed suit under both tort law and the Act.
43. 472 So. 2d 197 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Guillot, see infra
text accompanying notes 57-61.
44. The approach used by the court can be broken down in the following manner:
1) violence to the physical structure of the body is necessary for recovery under the Act;
2) some mental disabilities are occasioned by changes in delicate chemical balances within
the body which can be scientifically measured; 3) changes in these chemical balances
within the body are violence to the physical structure of the body; 4) therefore, mental
disabilities resulting in these changes in chemical balances result in an injury under the
Act.
This approach was in no way novel or outside the range of scholarly legal thought.
Indeed, it was pioneered by the Texas Supreme Court as early as 1955 in Bailey v.
American General Ins., 279 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1955). The Texas court considered the
physical structure of the body to be "the entire body, not simply to the skeletal structure
or to the circulatory system or to the digestive system. It refers to the whole, to the
complex of perfectly integrated and interdependent bones, tissues and organs which function
together by means of electrical, chemical and mechanical processes in a living, breathing,
functioning individual." Id. at 318 (emphasis in original).
45. 245 La. 33, 156 So. 2d 468 (1963). See supra note 33.
46. 196 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967). See supra text accompanying notes 32-
33.
47. Professor Johnson's opinion is in accord with that of the court. See Treatise,
supra note 40, § 235 at 83-84 (Supp. 1989).
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Fourth Circuit
The fourth circuit, at least since 1983, has marched to the beat of
a different drummer regarding the compensability of mental/mental
claims. This court, prior to Sparks,4 had granted relief to mental/mental
claimants in at least two cases.
In Taquino v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,49 plaintiff claimed com-
pensation benefits based on a nervous breakdown caused by a number
of stressful incidents at work. Being the first Louisiana court willing to
grant compensation benefits based solely on a mental injury caused by
job conditions, ° the court stated, "[w]e feel it is realistic to provide
indemnification based upon a worker's inability to perform as a result
of disability which arises out of employment, not because of the type
of injury. Our 'accident' definition does not distinguish between organic
and psychological injuries."'" The liberal nature of this interpretation
was accentuated by the fact that there was no "sudden or violent"
event, but a buildup of stress over an extended period. The court avoided
this obstacle by stating that the "accident ' 5 2 requirement was met if an
"accidental result," rather than an "accidental cause," existed. The
court found that the accidental result in this cases was a nervous break-
down.53
48. 546 So. 2d 138 (La. 1989).
49. 438 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 443 So. 2d 597 (1983).
50. It is critical to distinguish the reasoning in Taquino from that in Davis. The
Davis court based its decision upon a mental hysical basis, refusing to recognize a mental/
mental claim.
51. 438 So.2d at 627. La. R.S. 23:1021(7), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454,
§ 1, distinguishes between (7)(a), "Injury" and "personal injury," (7)(b), "Mental injury
caused by mental stress," and (7)(c), "Mental injury caused by physical injury." For
possible ramifications of this amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 91-128.
52. La. R.S. 23:1021(1), as amended by 1975 La. Acts No. 583, § 1.
53. The court reasoned that since our worker's compensation system evolved from
the British model, we should accept the British definition of accident as it relates to cause
or result. The court relied upon Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 264 La. 204, 270 So. 2d 867
(1972), for this assertion. With less than pristine clarity, the supreme court in Sparks
may have overruled the "accidental result" reasoning for cases such as Taquino while
preserving the "accidental result" reasoning for cases such as Ferguson. 546 So. 2d at
147. The court, in Sparks, stated, "We emphasize, however, that a mere showing that
a mental injury was related to general conditions of employment, or to incidents occurring
over an extended period of time, is not enough to entitle the claimant to compensation.
The mental injury must be precipitated by an accident, i.e., an unexpected and unforseen
event that occurs suddenly or violently." Id. (emphasis in original). In a footnote to this
quotation, the court elaborated, "While the sudden onset of physical injury may qualify
as the compensable 'accident' in some cases, see Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., supra, . . . an
employee's subjective assertion that he had a sudden onset of symptoms of mental injury,
such as depression or anxiety, is not alone sufficient to show that an accident occurred.
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Prior to Sparks, the fourth circuit's most recent mental/mental case
was Jones v. City of New Orleans.14 This case involved a home health
care nurse who alleged that she was disabled by "posttraumatic stress
disorder." This disability allegedly occurred after being informed of
threats made upon her safety as she entered New Orleans area housing
projects as a part of her employment. Due to paranoia surrounding the
incident, Ms. Jones was unable to return to work. The court in Jones
refused to get tangled in a web of confusion concerning statutory def-
initions; the court summed up its reason for awarding compensation by
stating, "If a worker suffers psychological disorders as a result of an
unexpected or unforeseen event, i.e. an accident, during the course of
employment, and that disorder results in disability, that worker is entitled
to compensation benefits." 55 Apparently the court considered the "ac-
cident" to have occurred when plaintiff was informed of the threat. In
the court's view, since this threat caused disability, the disability was
compensable. "The injury to Mrs. Jones does no less violence to the
physical structure of the body than a broken arm or leg." 5 6
Fifth Circuit
The fifth circuit confronted the mental/mental problem in Guillot
v. Sentry Insurance.5 7 This case, strikingly similar to Davis v. Oilfield
Scrap & Equipment Co.5" in terms of the court's reasoning, involved a
claims adjustor, afflicted with a preexisting emotional condition, who
suffered a job-related nervous breakdown after being fired from his job.
The court found that the "accident" 59 requirement was met when the
plaintiff's boss informed plaintiff that he was fired and that the "injury" 6
The employee must be able to point to a discernable employment-related event which
caused the mental injury, an event separate and apart from the onset of the symptoms
of that mental injury." Id. at n.7 (emphasis added). For a further discussion of this
aspect of Sparks, see infra text accompanying notes 67-78.
54. 514 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 515 So. 2d 1111 (1987).
55. Jones, 514 So. 2d at 613. It is interesting to note that the court appears to totally
disregard the "arising out of" employment requirement by making this statement. See
La. R.S. 23:1031, as amended by 1926 La. Acts No. 85, § 1, and the discussion of this
requirement in Treatise, supra note 40, §§ 191-93. The court does state in a later paragraph
that the plaintiff has to prove the existence of a causal connection between the disability
and employment. However, the quoted passage is misleading and should not be read as
doing away with the "arising out of employment" criteria in mental/mental cases.
56. Jones, 514 So. 2d at 614.
57. 472 So. 2d 197 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
58. 482 So. 2d 970 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986). See also supra text accompanying notes
40-42.
59. La. R.S. 23:1021(1), as amended by 1975 La. Acts No. 583, § 1.
60. La. R.S. 23:1021(7), as amended by 1975 La. Acts No. 583, § 1.
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requirement was met by "physiological changes in brain cells along with
biochemical changes that could be measured clinically." '6'
ANALYSIS OF SPARKS
By bringing mental/mental claims within the ambit of compensability
under the Act, Louisiana, after Sparks, joins the majority of states. 62
In analyzing Sparks, it is important to remember the narrow issue
presented to the court. The court phrased the issue as "whether a mental
injury induced by mental stress is compensable when it is caused by a
significant employment incident and is not accompanied by any apparent
signs of physical trauma. ' 63
The Clinic defended itself against plaintiff's claim to compensation
under the "big three" defenses which have heretofore been very suc-
cessful in defending mental/mental claims under the Act.64 The Clinic's
defenses were: 1) the injury did not result from an "accident" as defined
by the Act; 65 2) the injury did not involve "violence to the physical
structure of the body" and therefore did not meet the statutory definition
of "injury;" 66 and 3) alternatively, if the injury is determined to be
within the limits of the Act, plaintiff failed to show the required causal
relation to her employment.
As stated earlier, at the time of Sparks, the Act defined "accident"
as "an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently,
with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective
symptoms of an injury."' 67 The decision that the court had to make was
whether the "event" triggering coverage should be determined by utilizing
an "accidental cause" basis or an "accidental result" basis. In other
words, does an "accident" occur only when some unexpected occurrence
causing injury takes place, such as a collision or fall, or does an
"accident" occur when an unexpected "result" takes place, such as a
stroke or breakdown? Certainly the former would be considered an
"accident" under the Act if the remainder of the definition is met. As
to the latter, the court stated that in certain cases, "[t]he onset of the
illness or injury is viewed as the accident because, from the employee's
61. Guillot, 472 So. 2d at 201. The court in Davis v. Oilfield Scrap & Equip. Co.,
482 So. 2d 970 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), discussed supra text accompanying notes 40-42,
cited Guillot for this proposition.
62. See Larson, supra note 17, § 42.23 at 7-639 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
63. Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 139.
64. See status of mental/mental claims in Louisiana prior to Sparks, supra text
accompanying notes 24-61.
65. See supra note 22.
66. See supra note 21.
67. See supra note 22.
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perspective, the injury was an unforeseen event which occurred suddenly
or violently." 68 The court went on to state,
The "event" which triggers coverage, then, may be an unex-
pected and sudden or violent occurrence which causes injury,
or it may be an unexpected change in the employee's physical
conditions which renders him incapable of working, a change
caused at least in part by an employment incident.
69
However, the court later stated, while discussing the "injury" require-
ment, "The mental injury must be precipitated by an accident, i.e., an
unexpected and unforeseen event that occurs suddenly or violently.
' 70
In footnote 7 to this quotation, the court emphasized,
While the sudden onset of physical injury may qualify as the
compensable "accident" in some cases, see Ferguson v. HDE,
Inc., supra, (stroke), an employee's subjective assertion that he
had a sudden onset of symptoms of mental injury, such as
depression or anxiety, is not alone sufficient to show that an
accident occurred. The employee must be able to point to a
discernible employment-related event which caused the mental
injury, an event separate and apart from the onset of the symp-
toms of that mental injury.
Although not totally clear, it appears that the court has attempted
to jurisprudentially define two different interpretations of "accident"
under the Act. If the case concerns any claim other than a mental/
mental claim, an "accident" may occur if, from the employee's per-
spective, the injury itself was an unforeseen event which occurred sud-
denly or violently, such as a stroke or an aneurysm. If the claim,
however, was based on a mental injury caused by mental stress, the
breakdown or sudden disability would be insufficient. There must be
some employment-related event separate and apart from the onset of
the breakdown or other mental symptoms. In short, according to Sparks,
a mental/mental claim, unlike other claims, should be judged on an
"accidental cause" basis only. The "accidental result" basis is reserved
for all claims other than mental/mental claims. 7'
The court's reasoning appears to be an attempt to retain an element
of objective causation in mental/mental cases. To require the more
68. Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 142, citing Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 264 La. 204, 270 So.
2d 867 (1972).
69. Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 143, citing Treatise, supra note 40, at § 214 (1980 & Supp.
1989) (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 147.
71. It should be noted that if an injury is caused by employment and considered
neither an "accident" nor an "occupational disease," the employee may be able to seek
recovery in tort.
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restrictive "accidental cause" interpretation of accident under the Act
seems to address the troublesome prospect of recovery without a true
"accident" having caused the injury. However, this requirement stretches
the plain language of the statute in an effort to justify two different
interpretations of the "accident" definition. Either an accident occurs
or it does not occur. Since the definition of accident is to be applied
in all claims, theoretically the interpretation should be the same for all
claims. However, human experiences often defy the neat parameters of
statutory language, and a court's sense of equity sometimes dictates that
the jurisprudential results escape literal, sterile interpretations. 72
Many people, particularly employers and insurers, probably feel that
all claims should be measured by the Sparks "accidental cause" inter-
pretation. In spite of the possible theoretical inconsistencies, however,
the court's interpretation of "accident" as applicable to mental/mental
claims seems to be correct. 73 The potential for fraud in mental/mental
claims further supports this conclusion. Realistically, the court was faced
with only three choices in this regard. It could have interpreted "ac-
cident" for mental/mental claims just as it is interpreted for other claims;
so long as the injury was unforeseen, the "accident" criteria was met.
This interpretation would have possibly opened the floodgates to the
chronic feigner looking for the application of the "greenback poultice. ' 74
Alternatively, the court could have reversed past interpretations of an
"accident" being fulfilled by an "accidental result," such as a stroke
or other sudden illness. This solution would have undoubtedly denied
coverage to many deserving employees and run counter to the purposes
of the Act. Lastly, the court could have established, as it did, two
different interpretations of the statutory definition of "accident." In
72. See Harris v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 485 So. 2d 965 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 488 So. 2d 205 (1986) (jurisprudential expansion of employer's premises); Harvey
v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 6 So. 2d 747, (1942) (building killed
employee, not cyclone).
73. This "dual interpretation" concept has been used before by the court in a similar
context. Previously, in determining whether a claimant had sufficiently established cau-
sation, the court held that once there is proof of an accident and the following disability
without any intervening cause, a presumption is established that the accident caused the
disability. See-Bertrand v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 253 La. 1115, 221 So. 2d 816 (1968);
Walton v. Normandy Village Homes Ass'n, 475 So. 2d 320 (La. 1985). Yet, in Guidry
v. Sline Ind. Painters, 418 So. 2d 626, 633 (La. 1982), citing Prim v. City of Shreveport,
297 So. 2d 421 (La. 1974), the court stated that "there is no presumption, however, that
a vascular accident occurring on the job is caused by the employment. There must be a
causal link between the employer, or the work, and the accident." Since the presumption
is still valid as to claims other than those involving vascular injuries (and mental injuries),
two different interpretations exist as to when a presumption of causation is established.
74. See Miller v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 99 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1958).
1990]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
terms of preserving the delicate balance, 7 the court may have had
sufficient justification for the judicial gloss on the term "accident."
The dual interpretation, however, is a prime example of judicial ma-
nipulation of a statutory definition that may later lead to awkward
situations. Whether the courts are justified in creating such distinctions
where the literal language does not support the interpretation is a subject
of much debate.
The court could have simply used its "accidental event" interpre-
tation to deny recovery under the Act. It would have been both logical
and accurate to hold that plaintiff's disability was caused by, "a series
of events which took place over the course of six and one-half years"
as alleged by the Clinic. 76 Had that been the determination, plaintiff
would have been denied relief due to the lack of an "accidental cause"-
that is, no single identifiable event happening suddenly or violently. The
court, however, disagreed, stating that
the communication of the threats to plaintiff on April 6, 1987
was the event which produced injury in this case, not the in-
cidents which occurred in the years prior to the threats. The
accident thus occurred on April 6, 1987, and the events prior
to that date are relevant simply to the extent that they reinforce
the seriousness of the threats and lend credibility to plaintiff's
assertion that the threats caused her severe anxiety and distress. 77
In this fashion, the court destroyed Clinic's defense that no "accident"
had occurred. 78
The Clinic's next defense was that plaintiff's injury did not involve
"violence to the physical structure of the body," and therefore did not
75. Professors Wex Malone and H. Alston Johnson describe this "delicate balance"
as follows:
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee
represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in
order to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society.
The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases in which
he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages
and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by
compensation.
See Treatise, supra note 40, § 32 at 40.
76. Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 148 (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. The requirement within the "accident" definition in La. R.S. 23:1021(1), as
amended by 1983 La. Acts No. 1, § 1, that the event must produce "at the time objective
symptoms of an injury" was given cursory treatment in a footnote. The court pointed
out that this requirement is not strictly construed and "all that is required is a showing
that the accidental event produces some symptoms of a discernable injury at a point in
time sufficient to permit the conclusion that the injury was causally related to employment."
546 So. 2d at 146 n.5. See also Treatise, supra note 40, § 216.
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meet the statutory definition of "injury." At the time of Sparks, the
Act defined "injury" and "personal injury" as "injuries by violence
to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infections as
naturally result therefrom. ' 79 Citing numerous appellate court decisions,
the court held that the "violence" requirement was satisfied
when the injury has a violent or harmful effect on the employee's
physical condition, even if the cause of that change was not in
itself violent. Under the jurisprudence, there need not be a blow
or visible application of force in order for the 'violence' aspect
of the statutory definition to be satisfied. 0
The court here used a "violent result" analysis instead of a "violent
cause" analysis. This distinction is comparable to the previous analysis
of "accidental result" versus "accidental cause."'" The court, however,
did not establish a dual interpretation of "violence" as it did with
"accident." Therefore, the criteria of "violence" are met by the same
factors for mental/mental claims as well as they are with other claims.8 2
Having established that plaintiff's disability had a "violent" effect,
the court had to determine whether this effect was to the "physical
structure of the body," a part of the Clinic's second defense. Following
the lead set out by the Texas Supreme Court over 30 years earlier in
Bailey v. American General Insurance,3 as well as the fourth circuit
court of appeal in Taquino8 4 and Jones,85 the court held that mental
health is a part of the delicate machinery composing the physical structure
of the body. 6 This result is indeed reasonable since a mental injury can
certainly be just as incapacitating as a physical injury. 7 Finding that
plaintiff was mentally disabled and that a mental injury was "violence
to the physical structure of the body," the court easily disposed of the
Clinic's second defense.
79. See supra note 21.
80. Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 145 (emphasis in original).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 67-78.
82. This result is satisfactory and conforms to the accepted doctrine of taking one's
victim (employee) as one finds him. The possible propensity for abuse is tempered by
the safeguard of the "accidental cause" requirement described supra text accompanying
notes 67-78.
83. 279 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1955).
84. 438 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 443 So. 2d 597 (1983). See
supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
85. 514 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 515 So. 2d 1111 (1987). See
supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
86. Although there was "tangible" clinical evidence of "physiological" damages in
Davis v. Oilfield Scrap.and Equip. Co., 482 So. 2d 970 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986) (EEG
and chemical analyses), there was none in Bailey, Taquino or Sparks.
87. See Larson, supra note 17, § 4.23(a) at 7-655 to 656.
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The Clinic's last bulwark was that Ms. Sparks failed to show the
required causal relation between the disability and her employment.
Plaintiff's burden under the Act was to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence88 that her disability was caused by her employment. After
disposing of the "accident" and "injury" defenses, the court pointed
out,
Since three experts affirmatively testified that plaintiff's disability
was related to her employment, since defendant produced no
testimony to the contrary, and since whatever previous medical
problems plaintiff experienced were clearly not of the same
severity and scope as those brought on by the events of April
6, 1987, we find that plaintiff established by a preponderance
of the evidence that her injury was precipitated by the threats
to her safety.89
With this finding, the Louisiana Supreme Court may have mended
the split between the circuits and established that a mental injury induced
by mental stress can indeed be compensable under the Act when it is
caused by a significant employment incident, even if it is not accom-
panied by any apparent signs of physical trauma. 9°
PERTINENT CHANGES IN THE ACT AND THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON
MENTAL/MENTAL CLAIMS AFTER SPARKS
The 1989 Legislature amended the statutes controlling the three most
important factual considerations of the Sparks decision. 9' The changes
became effective January 1, 1990; hence it is instructive to evaluate
Sparks in light of these changes. As noted in the previous section, the
three main factual considerations in Sparks were: 1) whether an "ac-
cident" occurred; 2) whether an "injury" occurred; and 3) whether
plaintiff proved a causal connection between the "accident" and "in-
jury".
"Accident"
At the time of Sparks, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1021(1) read,
'Accident' means an unexpected or unforeseen event happening sud-
88. This burden is now "clear and convincing evidence." See La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(b)
as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § I (effective January 1, 1990). See infra text
accompanying notes 104-16.
89. Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 149.
90. The three dissenters disagreed. Justice Marcus felt neither an "accident" nor
"injury" occurred. Id. Justices Cole and pro tern Hall felt plaintiff's disability was due
to several years of work related stress and not an "accident." Id.
91. 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 1.
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denly or violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the
time objective symptoms of an injury." The 1989 amendment added,
"which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive de-
generation." 92 It appears that this amendment is an attempt to reduce
the possibility of compensation without causation, a fear of insurers. 9
The words, "producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury"
in the original definition were an attempt to do the same, but the courts
have practically ignored this aspect of the statute.94 The problem with
this amendment is that some injuries that should be compensable and
are caused by employment, such as strains, poisonings, slowly occurring
lung collapses, etc., are "gradual deteriorations" or "progressive de-
generations" and, as such, are arguably no longer covered under the
Act. 95 One should not lose sight of the fact that a degenerative injury
caused by employment should be compensable. 96 Although the amend-
ment taken literally would certainly not provide compensation for feigned
degenerative injuries, it would also leave valid claims uncompensated 97 -
an unwise and unjustified result.
In mental/mental claims, where the causation problem is at its apex,
the amendment seems less intrusive upon valid claims. However, one
should still not consider a degenerative mental injury non-compensable
due to the difficulty of proving it is caused by employment. This
causation problem was addressed by the amendment to Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1021(7), which raised the burden of proof in mental/mental
claims to "clear and convincing evidence." 98
The courts could avoid the harsh results of the amendment to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1021(1), prohibiting degenerative injuries
from being an "accident," by finding that cases involving what appear
to be valid claims indeed involve "accidents" even if the injury is
92. La. R.S. 23:1021(1), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 1 (effective January
1, 1990).
93. This fear is probably justified since an important compensation requirement is
that the injury be caused by the employment. See Treatise, supra note 40, § 32.
94. See supra note 78.
95. Since 1989 La. Acts No. 454 was conceived and lobbied by the Louisiana As-
sociation of Business and Industry, this amendment is anything but surprising. See Johnson,
Workers' Compensation, Developments in the Law, 1988-1989, 50 La. L. Rev. 391, 392
(1989).
96. Indeed, this is the reason the employee is given for relinquishing his right to a
tort recovery. The result is that injuries caused by employment should be compensable
regardless of fault. The fact that an injury is degenerative should be immaterial if it is
caused by employment.
97. The tension between the courts and the statute (legislature) demonstrates the force
of the political process in answering what it perceives as an abundance of previous liberal
decisions.
98. For a discussion of this concept see infra text accompanying notes 104-16.
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degenerative. Suppose, for example, that a worker, as an employment
task, must strenuously pull an unwieldy lever with his arm many times
daily. After five years of this continuous activity, the elbow swells and
the arm becomes severely disabled. The employee can no longer work
and the doctor opines that the constant strain has gradually worn the
joint in the elbow to a degree that surgery is necessary. A literal reading
of Section 1021(1) would result in an "accident" not having occurred;
hence there would be no recovery under the Act. However, the creative
judge could hold that an "accident" occurred suddenly on whatever
day the pulling of the lever caused the "straw to break the camel's
back." The day the employee pulled the lever and the arm began to
swell would mark the occurrence of the accident. Can it be doubted
that this "injury" should be recoverable under the Act? 99
The Louisiana courts have agreed that, "the 'wear and tear' type
diseases or harms are covered only if listed in the occupational disease
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." ° A strong argument
could be made that the amendment to the "accident" definition'0' is
but added verbiage that changes nothing. The irony of the amendment
to the definition of an "accident" is that the courts have long agreed
that degenerative injuries not caused by employment should not be
compensable. Sparks also refused to recognize a long term gradual
deterioration as compensable, evidenced by the court's employment of
the "accidental cause" interpretation. 0 2 The difference between the courts
and the legislature does not center around whether "gradual deterio-
rations" and "progressive degenerations" should be considered "acci-
dents" under the Act, but concerns just what facts should be accepted
as proving an "accident" took place. As illustrated in Sparks, the courts
have been quite adept at finding an "unexpected or unforeseen actual,
identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently."'0 3 There-
fore, under the 1989 amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1021(1),
Sparks should remain valid and a viable precedent for future mental/
mental cases.
99. As to mental/mental claims the reasoning should be the same, but causation will
rarely be as clear. This was precisely the case in Sparks. See supra text accompanying
notes 62-90. However, as indicated in the text, the solution is not to eliminate valid
claims, but to approach the problem from the standpoint of sufficiency of evidence. See
La. R.S. 23:1021 (7)(b), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 1 (effective January
1, 1990), and discussion infra text accompanying notes 104-16. Also see Larson, supra
note 17, § 42.23(b) at 7-661 to 669.
100. See La. R.S. 23:1031.1 (1985), as amended by 1980 La. Acts No. 666, §§ 1, 2
(effective July 24, 1980); Gotte v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 298 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 302 So. 2d 37 (1974).
101. See supra note 22.
102. See supra note 53 and text accompanying notes 67-78.
103. Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 142-43.
[Vol. 50
NOTES
"Injury" and the Causal Connection
At the time of Sparks, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1021(7) read,
'Injury' and 'personal injuries' include only injuries by violence to
the physical structure of the body and such disease or infections as
naturally result therefrom. These terms shall in no case be construed
to include any other form of disease or derangement, however caused
or contracted." The 1989 amendment added (7)(b) which states, "Mental
injury caused by mental stress. Mental injury or illness resulting from
work-related stress shall not be considered a personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment and is not compensable
pursuant to this Chapter, unless the mental injury was the result of a
sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment
and is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence."' 4 Therefore,
beginning January 1, 1990, the mental/mental plaintiff will have an
added statutory requirement to meet in order to recover under the Act.
The wording of the statute is not clear as to whether the "mental
injury" alone, the "sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress" alone,
or both the "mental injury" and "stress" must be demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence. To best conform to the purpose of the
law, 105 the statute should be interpreted to mean that both the "mental
injury" and the "sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related
to the employment" be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The
nebulous nature of mental/mental claims as well as the need to preserve
the "delicate balance ' 1°6 demand that the clear and convincing standard
apply to both.
Although comparisons to tort law should be avoided due to the
differing objectives of the two systems of recovery, a comparison at
this point may be useful. In the mental anguish tort case of In Re Air
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 0 7 the court stressed the importance
of the plaintiff establishing a "clear causal relation" between the property
damage and the mental anguish. A similar concern for establishing
causation in a mental/mental case was shown in Lejeune v. Rayne Branch
Hospital.0 8 A clear showing of causation is necessary to offset the ease
of subjective fabrication of mental anguish claims.' °9 Although the Act,
unlike tort law, is designed to be a "no fault" system, causation linked
to employment is necessary to recovery and the "clear and convincing"
104. La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(b), enacted by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § I (effective January
1, 1990) (emphasis added).
105. La. Civ. Code arts. 10, 12 & 13.
106. See supra note 75.
107. 764 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1985). See supra note 18.
108. 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990). See supra note 18.
109. See supra note 20.
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standard is an attempt to link recovery to proof of causation. Since
proof of causation is required under both tort law and the Act, the
reasoning espoused in Air Crash and Lejeune is valid as supporting the
"clear and convincing" standard as a necessary change to the Act.
Prior to this amendment, the burden of proof for plaintiff was that
the "injury" be proven by a "preponderance of the evidence." In
attempting to ascertain the difference between "preponderance" and
"clear and convincing," it becomes apparent that both terms are difficult
to quantify. The greatest practical difference is that "clear and con-
vincing" is a greater burden of proof than "preponderance" but a lesser
burden than "beyond a reasonable doubt.""10 In any event, it is clear
that the legislature has set a stricter standard of review for testing
causation in mental/mental cases than was set prior to the amendment.
Due to the competing lines of causation involved in most mental/mental
cases,"' this change is needed. To maintain the "delicate balance""' 2
necessary for the successful operation of the Act, it is essential that
only injuries, whether physical or mental, actually caused by employment
be covered by the Act. The elevated burden of proof provides the
statutory tool necessary for the court to effectively deny benefits to an
undeserving claimant who is attempting to utilize the vagueness present
in most mental/mental claims as a method of circumventing the true
purposes of the Act. Concurrently, this provision should not prevent a
truly deserving claimant under a mental/mental fact pattern from being
granted recovery under the Act. Because the claimant is in the best
position to prove the extent and cause of his disability, this added
burden should have no ill effects on the deserving employee while
110. Black's Law Dictionary 499 (5th ed. 1979) defines "preponderance of the evidence"
as, "A standard of proof (used in many civil suits) which is met when a party's evidence
on a fact indicates that it is 'more likely than not' that the fact is as the party alleges
it to be." Black's defines "beyond a reasonable doubt" as, "In evidence means fully
satisfied, entirely convinced, satisfied to a moral certainty; and phrase is the equivalent
of the words clear, precise and indubitable." Id. at 147. Black's defines "clear and
convincing proof" as, "Generally, this phrase and its numerous variations mean proof
beyond a reasonable, i.e., a well-founded doubt. Some cases give a less rigorous, but
somewhat uncertain meaning, viz., more than a preponderance but less than is required
in a criminal case." Id. at 227. But see Black's for the definition of "clear evidence or
proof," which states, "Evidence which is positive, precise and explicit, which tends directly
to establish the point to which it is adduced and is sufficient to make out a prima facie
case. It necessarily means a clear preponderance. It may mean no more than a fair
preponderance of proof but may also be construed as requiring a higher degree of
proof .... Id. at 228. See also G. Pugh, R. Force, G. Rault, & K. Triche, Handbook
on Louisiana Evidence Law 451-52 (1990) (index to use of "clear and convincing" standard
in Louisiana law).
111. See Treatise, supra note 40, § 235 (Supp. 1989).
112. See supra note 75.
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preventing the majority of undeserving recoveries." 3 The minimum prac-
tical effect of the amendment will be to require the courts to look more
closely at the causation issue in mental/mental cases and require ad-
ditional proof of the claim.
Whether Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1021(7)(b) statutorily over-
rules Sparks is a question of degree. The fact that the Act now expressly
recognizes a mental/mental claim is proof that the narrow holding of
Sparks is now embedded in the Act." 4 The harder question is whether
the facts giving rise to recovery in Sparks would now support recovery
under Section 1021(7)(b). Since the 1989 amendment was probably written
to overrule such cases as Taquino,"'5 the answer will depend on the
court's willingness to continue to conclude, even under the stricter ev-
identiary standard, that such acts as the meeting of Sparks, Spillars,
and Davis qualify as causing "sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary
stress.""16 If the court is willing to do so, then, Section 1021(7)(b) may
be empty rhetoric.
EFFECTS OF LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 23:1221(l)(c) & (D) ON
MENTAL/MENTAL CLAIMS
The plaintiff in Sparks was awarded recovery based upon temporary
total disability." 7 In 1989, the Louisiana Legislature amended Louisiana
113. Plaintiff's ability to meet his burden of proof as to causation in a mental/mental
case will, to a large degree, depend upon the believability of the expert witness. The
problem remains, however, that reasonable minds may differ, leaving the court in a
position to choose between two equally plausible theories of causation. For an amusing
case of a court being less than impressed with an expert medical witness, while still
illustrating the serious problem of proving causation in mental cases, see Ladner v. Higgins,
71 So. 2d 242 (La. App. Orlo 1954). In Ladner, the expert witness, a physician, was
asked by counsel, "Is that your conclusion that this man is a malingerer?" Dr. Unsworth
responded: "I wouldn't be testifying if I didn't think so, unless I was on the other side,
then it would be a post traumatic condition." Id. at 244.
Many times plaintiff's work record will assist in the determination of the validity of
the claim. Most "feigners" or "malingerers" are not created overnight. They usually will
have practiced the "art" most of their lives.
114. The narrow holding of Sparks is simply that a mental injury induced by mental
stress is compensable under the Act when it is caused by a significant employment incident,
even though it is not accompanied by any apparent signs of physical trauma. See La.
R.S. 23:1021(7)(b) (Supp. 1990).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
116. Certainly fact patterns such as those illustrated by Sutherland (supra text accom-
panying notes 24-26), Franklin (supra text accompanying notes 30-31), Hackett (supra text
accompanying notes 32-33), and Davis (supra text accompanying notes 40-47) should
support recovery after Sparks and be strong enough to prove causation under La. R.S.
23:1021(7)(b), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 1 (effective January 1, 1990).
On the other hand, cases such as Taquino (supra text accompanying notes 49-53), containing
competing lines of causation not effectively severed by one sudden work related event
should be statutorily overruled.
117. La. R.S. 23:1221, as amended by 1983 La. Acts No. 1, § 1 (1st Ex. Sess.).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Revised Statutes 23:1221 by adding subparagraphs (c) and (d) '8 Which
now hinges the award of benefits based on temporary total disability
upon the "physical condition" of the recipient. Do these two newly-
enacted paragraphs prohibit a plaintiff who is mentally unable to engage
in employment from receiving temporary total disability compensation?
When read in conjunction with the other sections of the Act," 9 the
answer should be "no." It would hardly seem rational to expressly
provide for recovery based upon a mental/mental claim 20 and to deny
recovery in the same Act if the claimant is mentally unable to return
to work. Surely, such a strained interpretation would not do justice to
the civilian tradition of interpreting statutes "in pari materia." However,
one may expect a future mental/mental claim to be challenged on this
basis, although the challenge should not be successful.
In 1983, the legislature amended Section 1221(2) to enact subpar-
agraph (c), which provided for the same results regarding permanent
total disabilities as the 1989 amendment provided for temporary total
disabilities. Professor Alston Johnson, in his treatise of the subject,
clearly stated that the 1983 amendment should not be interpreted as
denying recovery for injuries based on mental causes.' 2' Professor John-
son's reasoning is just as persuasive for claims based on a temporary
total disability.
Due to the expressed recovery now available for mental/mental
claims, the wording of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(l)(c) and (d)
and .(2)(c) is anomalous and should be revised. It is hoped that the
legislature will attend to this housekeeping chore and delete the word
"physically" from Section 1221(1)(c) and (2)(c) and the word "physical"
from Section 1221(1)(d). Such an amendment will prevent the Act from
being inherently contradictory in respect to this issue.
ANOTHER CONSIDERATION
It should be pointed out that the 1989 legislation also enacted
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1021(7)(c) and (d). Section 1021(7)(c) con-
cerns a mental/physical injury. Section 1021(7)(d) is particularly inter-
esting, stating that no mental/physical claim shall be compensable unless
the mental injury or illness is diagnosed by certain qualified individuals
using certain accepted evaluative criteria. 22 One wonders why this pro-
118. See supra note 16 for the text of this statute.
119. See La. Civ. Code art 13.
120. See infra note 126.
121. See Treatise, supra note 40, § 281 (Supp. 1989):
122. La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(d), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 1 (effective
January 1, 1990), states the following:
No mental injury or illness shall be compensable under Subparagraph (c) [the
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phylactic measure is applied to mental/physical claims, and not to the
more suspicious mental/mental claims. Possibly, the legislature felt the
restrictions imposed by the more constrictive construction of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1021(7)(b) provide sufficient safeguards against spu-
rious mental/mental claims.123 In any event, Section 1021(7)(d) is puzzling
as to its limited application to mental/physical claims. 124
CONCLUSION
One wonders whether the more significant effect upon the status of
mental/mental claims in Louisiana will be the Sparks 25 decision, or the
amendments made to the Act by the 1989 Louisiana Legislature. There
are some certainties apparent from both. Mental/mental claims are now
statutorily compensable 26 under the Act although the burden of proving
causation is more strongly levied against the claimant. The true litmus
test will be the practical significance given by the courts to the new
"clear and convincing" standard of proof. Although the burden of
proof is greater, the courts maintain much latitude when deciding whether
the facts presented by the claimant warrant recovery. No amount of
legislative tinkering can change the fact that the statute must be inter-
preted in light of the facts presented.
"mental hysical" subparagraph] unless the mental injury or illness is diagnosed
by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and the diagnosis of the condition
meets the criteria as established in the most current issue of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders presented by the American Psychiatric
Association.
123. Legislative intent in this regard cannot be gleaned from any available records.
Consider the words of United States Fifth Circuit Judge John R. Brown in American
Petro. Inst. v. E.P.A., 661 F.2d 340, 355 (5th Cir. 1981). Judge Brown stated, "A
singularly unhelpful source of information, legislative history always contains self-serving
statements that support either side of an argument and most points between."
124. Another issue spawned by recent legislative action is the creation of "administrative
hearing officers." These officers will serve as the initial adjudicator to any contested
claims under the Act. An appeal from the decision of the "hearing officer" to the
appropriate court of appeal will be allowed on a question of law, a question of fact, or
both. The controversy surrounds the fact that the appeal shall be determined "on the
record" made before the hearing officer. This lack of de novo review is likely to be
tested as a constitutional question. This predicted challenge is evidenced by statutory
provisions within the Act providing for contingencies in case such challenge is successful.
A complete analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. The reader may find
it helpful to consult 1988 La. Acts No. 938 and 1989 La. Acts No. 23, 43, 260, & 454.
Special attention should be focused upon La. R.S. 23:1141 (Supp. 1989).
125. 546 So. 2d 138 (La. 1989).
126. See La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(b) (Supp. 1990).
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Other than the new "clear and convincing" burden of proof, the
amended "accident' ' ' 27 and "injury and personal injuries' 128 definitions
should prove inconsequential in light of the reasoning used in Sparks.
The judiciary continues to possess much freedom to apply the definitions
to the facts. The new statutory parameters are not so strictly defined
as to prevent judicial interpretation in furtherance of equity. For this
reason, the circuits may still remain "split" regarding the compensability
of mental/mental claims after Sparks and the 1989 legislative session.
In other words, facts that support recovery in one circuit may not
support recovery in another circuit. Hopefully, all available interpretive
skills will be utilized in an effort to compensate valid claims and deny
claims that fall outside of the underlying policy bases of the workers'
compensation system.
Darrell James Loup
127. La. R.S. 23:1021(1), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § I (effective January
1, 1990).
128. La. R.S. 23:1021(7), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 1 (effective January
1, 1990).
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